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others. Bedau unfortunately destroys the force and point of Williams’s famous
story.
Nevertheless, some useful procedural distinctions emerge in the course of
the fictional cases: between justifying causing harm to others, and excusing
someone from blame for doing this, i.e. it was wrong, but in the circumstances
could not be helped. They also provide new lists in which some of the Holmes
principles recur, but in which others too, are discovered, including Self-
defence and Self-preservation; and what might turn out to be somewhat disas-
trous in its range of application, a ‘rights’ principle according to which ‘one
who has a right to the end has a right to some means sufficient to that end’.
In the Jim case, it is interesting to note that the further information Bedau
demands is the kind of ‘further information’ that Kohlbergian researchers were
debarred from allowing their subjects in response to their presentation of the
Heinz dilemma (should Heinz steal a costly and unique drug to save the life of
his spouse?) And interesting, too, to notice that, very much linked to that
research, the new feminist critique of traditional approaches to ethics owed a
great deal to noticing that it was women, far more than men, who had a ten-
dency to ask for further information about context and detail.
This is a book, then, which can be recommended as a graphic and colourful
way in which to approach ethical theory and the problem of making difficult
moral choices. It offers a method of identifying and deploying rules of thumb
which can indeed be helpful, but fiction and imagination are allowed to pro-
vide too ready an escape route in discussion of the better-known constructed
cases.




Socratic Wisdom: The Model of Knowledge in Plato’s Early Dia-
logues, by Hugh H. Benson. New York: Oxford University Press USA, .
Pp. ix + . H/b £..
Is there an epistemology in Plato’s early, Socratic, dialogues? Hugh Benson
believes there is, and has written an engaging book to show that the prevailing
view that ‘Socrates is no epistemologist’ must be rejected (p. ). Whose episte-
mology is it? As the quotation immediately preceding indicates, it is Socrates’s
own. Who is Socrates? Purely, Benson claims, a ‘character in Plato’s early dia-
logues’ (p. ). That character’s views, however, are identical with the epistemo-
logical ideas of the historical Socrates (p. ), and that identification, as we
shall see, has serious implications for the kind of evidence to which Benson
appeals in his argument. What is it to have an epistemology? It is to make
knowledge ‘an object of reflective examination’ (p. , n. ). Contrary to the
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influential reading of Gregory Vlastos, Socrates is not simply an ‘ironist and
moral philosopher’; he is also responsible for making the nature of knowledge
one of philosophy’s central concerns.
Socratic Wisdom has a clear and articulate structure. Its first part examines
Socrates’s dialectical method, the ‘elenchos’, in order to establish what Socrates
thinks knowledge must be like if he believes that showing that his various
interlocutors’ views are inconsistent reveals their ignorance of its nature. Its
second part investigates the model of knowledge which leads Socrates to
believe (as Benson claims he does) that one cannot know anything about any
object unless one knows its definition, and uncovers at least an apparent confl-
ict between the features of knowledge required by the elenchos and those pre-
supposed by Socrates’s view of definition. The third and final part presents a
model of knowledge which is closer to the commonsense notion of ‘under-
standing’ instead of the philosophical construct of ‘justified true belief ’ and
which, Benson argues, reduces that conflict, even if it leaves Socrates’s episte-
mology with two further problems: first, understanding seems very difficult to
acquire; second, it appears that understanding anything requires understand-
ing everything. Benson is not disturbed by these problems. On the contrary, he
concludes that since they also exercised Plato and Aristotle, the epistemology
he attributes to Socrates is historically plausible; and since they are still with
us, the notion of understanding is philosophically important. 
From one point of view, Benson’s book is a series of disagreements with
Vlastos. In addition to the issue of Socrates’s epistemology, for example, Ben-
son argues convincingly that the elenchos shows only that Socrates’s interlocu-
tors’ beliefs are inconsistent and not, as Vlastos believed, that their definitions
of the virtues are false. He rejects Vlastos’s idea that Socrates claims to know
several moral truths, in apparent conflict with his profession of ignorance, and
the distinction between ‘elenctic’ and ‘certain’ knowledge through which Vlas-
tos attempted to resolve it; his careful examination of the textual evidence
shows that the issue may be more complex than we have supposed. He claims
that Socrates’s principle of ‘the priority of definition’ is the very strong view
that one cannot know anything about an object unless one knows its defini-
tion and not the weaker (and, to my mind, more reasonable) position Vlastos
attributed to him. 
From another point of view, however, Socratic Wisdom is a straightforward
continuation of Vlastos’s approach to Plato’s Socratic dialogues. Benson makes
no secret of his dependence on Vlastos and of his gratitude to him. His proce-
dure confirms both the range of problems Vlastos considered significant and
the principles on which his reading of Plato depended. 
One of these principles (to which Benson, I believe, adheres in his discus-
sion of Socratic ignorance, though not in his examination of the elenchos) is
that only explicit statements and their logical presuppositions and conse-
quences can raise, and can be used to resolve, the philosophical and interpreta-
tive questions of Plato’s dialogues. Vlastos, for example, argued that Socrates’s
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professions of ignorance of the nature of virtue, given his view that virtue
requires that knowledge, seem to conflict with his confidence that he is virtu-
ous. Benson replies, and Vlastos would have agreed, that if the texts where Soc-
rates appears to say that he is virtuous do not in fact commit him to such a
claim the conflict would disappear; he then argues that they actually don’t
(pp. –). Perhaps Benson is right: his view is certainly worth considering.
Still, even if he is, the conflict does not disappear. For, in addition to the texts
where Socrates seems to say that he is virtuous, we also need to consider the
way in which the dialogues, within which he functions as a literary character,
depict him: even if he never makes Socrates assert his virtue, Plato consistently
portrays him as a virtuous man—and by that I don’t mean simply someone
who fights bravely, obeys the gods’ command, and so on, but a person with the
truly extraordinary devotion to the pursuit of virtue which, in Socrates’s case,
constituted virtue itself. If we take seriously the view that Socrates is a literary
character, we cannot begin to understand him without asking how Plato repre-
sents him; and once we do, explicit statements will often not be enough to
determine the nature of Socrates’s character or the philosophical issues the
dialogues raise.
To interpret Socrates only on the basis of his explicit statements is, in my
opinion, to try to treat him as a historical personage after all, relying on evi-
dence which he (and not his author) seems to provide. But that is an illusion,
since all the evidence, direct and indirect, is Plato’s own and cannot be under-
stood without reference to his intentions. Benson argues, for example, that
because Socrates recognizes his ignorance he refrains from ‘positive, bold, and
extraordinary action’ and adopts ‘a policy of inaction’ which, though not iden-
tical with virtue, is less likely to cause harm than the willingness to act (pp.
–). What, now, is the evidence for Socrates’s life of inaction? All of it con-
sists of various statements Socrates makes: he says that he did not participate in
politics, that he voted against the illegal execution of the Arginousai generals
and that he refused to assist in the illegal arrest of Leon; he tells Euthyphro that
he should be ashamed to prosecute his father without knowing what piety is;
he counsels Laches and Nicias not to offer advice regarding education without
knowing the nature of virtue and refuses to do so himself; he argues that it is
better to suffer injustice rather than do it; he claims that an unwise man will be
better off if he is poor because he will then be able to do less and will therefore
make fewer mistakes. But even if we grant that all these statements recommend
inaction over action, Plato has Socrates make them as he depicts him in the
process of acting—either engaging in the elenchos or defending it— in a man-
ner that proved to be ‘positive, bold, and extraordinary’ enough to cause his
own death!
One might argue, of course, that Plato does not portray Socrates as a virtu-
ous man, and that disarming his claims to be virtuous eliminates the conflict
with his professions of ignorance. But isn’t Socrates virtuous? Is his life in any
way deficient? What else does he need? He only lacks the knowledge he consid-
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ers necessary for virtue. The logical conflict between his explicit statements
now emerges as a literary paradox, a tension between his views and his prac-
tice.
Judged on its own terms, however, Socratic Wisdom is serious and success-
ful. Benson’s minimalist view of the elenchos, according to which Socrates need
not believe any of the premisses he uses to show that his interlocutors are
inconsistent and therefore ignorant (and nothing more) is, as I have already
said, compelling. Benson claims that this implies that Socrates distinguishes
between knowledge and true belief because otherwise ‘it is difficult to see how
he could take himself to have established the interlocutor’s ignorance when he
does not take himself to have established the falsehood of the interlocutor’s
belief ’ (p. ). Benson also argues, however, that ‘Socrates thinks that defini-
tional knowledge suffices for getting things right. And the implausibility of
supposing that mere knowledge of a (definitional) proposition suffices for get-
ting things right forces us to distrust a simple-minded … account of Socratic
definitional knowledge, according to which definitional knowledge is merely
the justified true belief of a definitional proposition’ (p. ).
That is why he proposes to construe Socratic knowledge on the model of
understanding. But that, I think, eliminates the need to distinguish between
knowledge and true belief. Since understanding is less of particular proposi-
tions than of fields (Benson cites medicine and navigation as Platonic exam-
ples, and uses gravity and history as his own), Socrates may think that
inconsistent views reveal ignorance without having to attribute true beliefs to
someone who happens to have, by accident, the right idea about one of a field’s
elements. If virtue, for example, is such a field and Charmides is ignorant of it,
he may accept a definition of temperance which could eventually prove to be
true, and still fail to believe it truly, as Benson thinks he does, in any but the
most trivial, uninformative sense (pp. –, ). Understanding, in my view, is
always of fields of interrelated propositions, and the very nature of those prop-
ositions is determined by their interrelations. Entertaining a true proposition
without understanding its interrelations, therefore, does not even imply that
one understands the proposition in question, and saying that one believes it
truly is saying very little indeed.
Benson is not (and does not claim to be) the first author to call attention to
the importance of understanding both for the interpretation of Plato and for
epistemology more generally. His careful and systematic book is a significant
step in the right direction, although many questions (more than I can raise in
this review) remain unanswered. Benson, for example, claims that Socratic
knowledge yields ‘completely reliable’ judgements concerning its object. But
that is true neither of the technai with which Socrates constantly compares
knowledge nor of the cases Benson himself cites: ‘At least part of what we have
in mind in saying that Einstein understands gravity’, he writes, ‘is a contrast
between Einstein’s cognitive states concerning gravity and most of the rest of
us’ (p. ). That is true, but it does not imply that Einstein’s judgements con-
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cerning gravity are ‘completely reliable’. He argues that ‘genuine understand-
ing’, like Socratic knowledge, ‘is something that few, if any people, have’, but
the understanding expressed in the theory of general relativity is hardly limited
to Einstein himself, while no one (except perhaps for Socrates) has ever been
shown to possess the knowledge pursued in Plato’s early dialogues. 
Still, Benson makes a strong and convincing case for trying to capture the
notion of knowledge Socrates and his successors were after by means of the
concept of understanding, or one of its variants. That is an idea worth pursu-
ing, and its implications will be very significant in the long run. Benson’s
argument is in general both philosophically and historically plausible. My disa-
greement with several of his substantive positions as well as his methodological
literalism does not in any way prevent me from recognizing Socratic Wisdom as a
work to be taken seriously by everyone concerned with Plato or a more complex
and engaging approach to the problems of epistemology.





Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism, by Robert
B. Brandom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, . Pp. . H/b
£..
Articulating Reasons contains a substantial introduction and six chapters, four
of which have been previously published (in some form) during the last 
years. It ‘presents ideas and arguments drawn from or developing out of
[Brandom’s]  book Making It Explicit (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press) and is aimed at readers who have ‘perhaps not so much dipped into
the big book but [are] curious about its themes and philosophical conse-
quences’ (pp. –). A book of just  small pages inevitably omits much of
the detail contained in a work of  large ones: the reader of the current book
is referred to Making It Explicit for more on the presuppositions, motivations,
and commitments of Brandom’s views. So, as Brandom says, Articulating Rea-
sons will contain no surprises for those already familiar with his work. But it is
enormously helpful to have this succinct and accessible introduction to the
work of an important, ambitious and increasingly influential philosopher.
There will be many who have shared a growing awareness of the significance
and originality of Brandom’s ideas, but have been daunted by the sheer scale of
Making It Explicit from studying his views at first hand. This book is the per-
fect way in.
Brandom sets out his stall in an introduction that identifies a series of oppo-
sitions in philosophical accounts of thought and meaning, and uses them to
